

# **IN THE SHADOW OF NATIONALISM: PELNI DURING THE PERIOD OF *INDONESIANISASI***

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## **I. Introduction**

Nationalisation of foreign enterprises is one of the most crucial phenomena in Indonesia history during the period of 1950s. The idea nationalisation of foreign enterprises in Indonesia has actually emerged during the revolution era (Kahin, 1952: 172-178). This relates with the fact that most parts of Indonesian economic resources were still in hand of foreign enterprises. It is said that Indonesian independence at that time was solely a political achievement. Politically, Indonesia was free from colonisation, but economically it still depended on its former mother country, the Netherlands. During the revolution, about 25 per cent of the Indonesian GDP and 10 per cent of the important positions in modern economic sectors were still controlled by the Dutch. Even in 1950, more than 6,000 Dutch personnel held senior positions in banks, agricultural and mining enterprises, trade companies, etc. (Thee Kian Wie, 1995: 2; Dick, 2002: 153-93). This can be understood since during that time Indonesia faced the paucity of experienced technicians and managers (Glassburner, 1971: 50).

More ironic situation was experienced by domestic sea transportation. Only a week after proclamation of independence (17 August 1945), this economic sector was dominated by the KPM, Dutch-owned enterprise, which operated on Indonesia waters since 1891, while the position of indigenous prahu shipping was very marginal.<sup>1</sup> This situation continually persisted until the acknowledgement of sovereignty in 1949. It seems that the decolonisation in domestic sea transportation did not go smoothly. This problem aroused emotion on both sides. On the one hand, the Dutch viewed the KPM as a symbol of their glory and dignity; on the other hand the presence of the KPM on the Indonesia waters in the post independence was seen as thorn in the flesh by Indonesia nationalists (Chia Lin Sien, 1989: 122). This explains why the negotiation process for establishing a joint shipping enterprise between the two failed. Accompanied by raging nationalism spirit, the Indonesian government declared the establishment of PELNI on 28 April 1952 without considering the existence of the KPM. This

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paper begins by tracing the emergence of Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia/ Indonesian National Shipping Company (PELNI) in 1952 in connection with the process of *Indonesianisasi* in sea transportation sector. It then answers the question of why the *Indonesianisasi* in sea transportation sector could not immediately place the PELNI as a dominant state shipping company in Indonesia even after the expulsion of the KPM on 6 December 1957.

## **II. Towards a National Shipping Company: The Fail Negotiation**

The revolutionary spirit in Indonesia made the KPM's presence in Indonesian waters a thorn in the flesh. Even the *Konperensi Meja Bundar* (KMB or Round Table Conference) of 1949 was unable to solve the question of the future of the KPM in Indonesia. On the one hand, the KPM was obviously not able to dictate terms to the Indonesian government; on the other hand the Indonesian government could not fully intervene in the KPM's operations in Indonesia.<sup>2</sup> If the Indonesian government imposed tight regulations, the KPM might leave Indonesian waters immediately, despite the Indonesian government's inability to establish a shipping company that could take its place in interregional shipping. Although the Round Table Conference did not decide the future of the KPM in Indonesia, the Indonesian government did guarantee that the Dutch KPM was provided with the same status as Indonesian-flagged ships in interregional shipping in Indonesia (Dick, 1987: 14).

By the end of the 1940s, the emerging question was increasingly on the subject of ownership of the KPM rather than how this shipping company would be operated in Indonesia. This was symptomatic of the Indonesian government's desire to nationalise Dutch concerns. In April 1950, the Indonesian government proposed to establish a new joint shipping company called the Indonesian Steamship Company (ISC) in which the Indonesian government had 51 per cent of the shares and the KPM 49 per cent.<sup>3</sup> The ISC would take the place of the KPM in Indonesia and the new company would buy the KPM's fleet. The KPM

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<sup>1</sup> The KPM in its interinsular traffic (including Singapore, Penang and Timor Dilly) carried in 1948 2.6 million tons of goods, as against a little over 1.5 million tons in 1947. See "Present Economic Condition in Indonesia", *The Economic Review of Indonesia* 3 (2) 1949, 1-12.

<sup>2</sup> Indonesian government also had right in deciding the KPM tariff. In 1954 for example, the KPM proposed to raise its freight tariff to 60% for passenger and 9% for cargo. But the Indonesia government approved the proposed raising tariff 50% and 10% for passenger and cargo respectively. See 'Dari ruang sidang Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, Tindakan-tindakan Pemerintah di lapangan ekonomi', *Warta Ekonomi* 9 (15/16) (21 April 1956), 137-142.

<sup>3</sup> The government regulated the composition of shareholders to avoid the monopoly of foreign companies. The Indonesian government gave chance to foreign investors to invest their capital in telecommunication, inter-insular shipping, electricity, irrigation, etc., but they felt the composition should be a maximum of 49 per cent foreign capital and a minimum of 51 per cent for Indonesian capital (NA: KPM/KJCPL, Inv. no. 675).

suggested a similar proposal with the condition that both parties had a fair share and the KPM's fleet was allowed to operate on the Indonesian waters (à Campo, 1998: 24-25). Obviously, the Indonesian government refused such a proposal. After the Indonesian-Dutch Union was dissolved on 17 August 1950, the Indonesian Minister of Communication, Ir. Juanda, took the initiative to establish a state shipping company and offered to buy the KPM's fleet for interregional shipping in Indonesia. The KPM turned down this proposal. Eventually, agreement was reached to set up a co-operation between the KPM and the proposed state shipping company (Dick, 1987: 14-15).<sup>4</sup>

On 6 September 1950, Soenar Soerapoetra and Alfons P. Lolong established the *Penguasaan Pusat Kapal-kapal* (PEPUSKA or Centre Authority of Ships) foundation. R. Soenar Soerapoetra (former steersman of the KPM) chaired the foundation and Chris. Ponto (former financial director of the NOCEMO in Manado) was vice-chairman. One of the aims of the foundation was to develop an Indonesian shipping business both for domestic and international shipping by constructing, selling and hiring ships for Indonesian companies (Soerapoetra, 1994: 47). The first step taken by the PEPUSKA was to nationalise the SGS, which was established by the NICA in co-operation with the KPM in 1947. This was intended to prevent dual management in the shipping development in Indonesia. In February 1951, the SGS was liquidated and all its assets were taken over by the PEPUSKA (NA: KPM/KJCPL, Inv. no. 201).

With much enthusiasm for taking further steps, the PEPUSKA obtained financial aid of f. 48,000,000 from the government to purchase six ships from Germany and Italy at the end of 1951.<sup>5</sup> Apart from that, the PEPUSKA also inherited 9 coasters from the SGS that were hired to several private coastal shipping companies. In the beginning, it was hoped that the PEPUSKA had its own moderate ships to compete with the KPM in the main routes. In 1952, the PEPUSKA imported 45-ship engines from the USA and also ordered compatible ship's bodies from some countries in Europe for the interislands shipping in Indonesia. It was projected that the PEPUSKA would be able to compete with the KPM in interislands shipping. To expand the Indonesian shipping companies on international waters, the PEPUSKA established an office in Amsterdam (Soerapoetra, 1994: 49).

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<sup>4</sup> At that time, the KPM was in co-operation with the Strait Steamship Company in transporting petroleum between Sambu-Pontianak-Pamangkat (ANRI: Algemene Secretarie 1944-1949, Inv. no. 1095).

<sup>5</sup> These ships were 'Borobudur', 'Prambanan', 'Mendut', 'Kalimantan', 'Timor', and 'Irian'. The last three are the names of islands still under the British, Portuguese, and Dutch colonialists, respectively, thus reflecting the spirit of anti-colonialism (Dick, 1987: 16; Ibrahim, 1994: 30-36)

In the meantime there was increasing number of private shipping companies which joined PEPUSKA. The membership did not only consist of former SGS members but some new private shipping companies as well, such as PT Perpelin and PT Kalimantan, both established in 1951.<sup>6</sup> But private shipping companies hoped that the PEPUSKA would not operate its own ships, as its main task was merely to boost the development of the Indonesian private shipping companies. It was established at the time when the government expected a co-operation between the KPM and the Indonesian state-shipping company. Therefore, PEPUSKA's main function was like a rental agency to the Indonesian private shipping companies which had no active part in shipping services (Sumantri, 1959: 14).

The idea of establishing a state-owned shipping company was raised in the early 1950s, when the Indonesian Federal State was dissolved. However, anxieties about the possible competition with the powerful KPM kept this plan from ever being realised (Kartodimedjo, 1963: 11). Seeing that negotiations between the government and the KPM were not very successful, the Indonesian government became convinced that it should establish a state-owned shipping company in spite of the existence of the KPM. On 30 April 1952, the government founded the *Pelayaran Nasional Indonesia* (PELNI or Indonesian National Shipping Company). It started with a nominal capital of only 200 million rupiahs, the PELNI was granted a right to take over all the PEPUSKA assets including its 500 officials. The main purpose of the PELNI was to serve the public as well as the government in transporting people, livestock and goods. Similar to the position of the KPM during the Dutch colonial time, the PELNI functioned as the main sea transport apparatus (*sarana angkutan laut pusat/central zeevervoer apparaat*) (Soerapoetra, 1994: 51). Unlike the PEPUSKA, however, the PELNI was given authority to operate its ships as a commercial institution. Consequently, the PELNI had to compete with the KPM on domestic shipping, especially in trunk lines (Hardikusumo, 1990: 4).

### **III. PELNI 1952-1957: Facing a New Dilemma**

Competition between the KPM and the PELNI lay in the fact that both companies acted as a central sea transport apparatus. In the meantime, private shipping companies serving the interislands shipping could become the feeder fleet of the KPM and the PELNI. But private shipping companies were also allowed to apply for serving the trunk lines and therefore also compete with the PELNI and the KPM, although the primary fights were between the latter

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<sup>6</sup> PT PERPELIN was established in Surabaya for coastal shipping in East Java, Madura, and Nusa Tenggara, while PT Kalimantan was established in Banjarmasin for coastal shipping between

two (Sulaiman, 1959: 40-43). The PELNI actually had a greater chance of winning since it had strong support from the Indonesian government. The PELNI was given the right to transport government goods and passengers, as the KPM had done under the Dutch colonial authority. As it was still in its infancy, the PELNI had not yet made a great impact. In 1956, the PELNI and private shipping companies made up only 25 per cent of the total in interisland transport and short sea shipping, while 75 per cent was handled by the KPM. This changed in 1957 into 29 per cent and 71 per cent respectively. In 1952, the KPM transported 646,000 tons of government goods, although in 1954 this figure decreased to 359,000 tons (Dick, 1987: 19).

It thus appears that the PELNI, as a new shipping company, was too small to compete with the KPM, in terms of both number of ships and their capacity as well as in shipping experience. In the mid-1950s, however, the KPM's capacity began to decrease due to both its failure in negotiating the Indonesian government, and the internal development of the PELNI. A comparison of fleets of the PELNI and the KPM can be seen in Tables 1.

**Table 1.**  
**Number of ships owned by PELNI and KPM, 1940-1958**

Year	PELNI	KPM
1940	-	138
1952	21	111
1953	45	98
1954	51	100
1955	44	98
1956	46	96
1957	50	-
1958	57	-

Source: BPS, *Statistical Pocketbook of Indonesia 1959* (Jakarta: BPS) 174.

The table shows that the size of the KPM's fleet gradually decreased, while the PELNI's fleet increased. The decrease of the PELNI's fleet only occurred in 1955 as the PELNI sold its small vessels to Indonesian private shipping companies after the negotiation between the government, the parliament, the PELNI and private shipping companies (Soerapoetra, 1994: 54). As the PELNI did not have large ships, the KPM benefited by operating large ships in their stead. The total tonnage of the KPM's fleet operating in Indonesia increased from 185,945 gross tons in 1952 to 190,547 in 1956. But numbers decreased from 111 in 1952 to 96 in 1956. By operating bigger ships, the KPM could serve long-distance routes of

interisland shipping in Indonesia ranging from Singapore to the eastern part of Indonesia. In the meantime, total tonnage of the PELNI increased from 20,450 gross tons in 1952 to 87,007 in 1959, while the number of ships also increased from 21 to 57 (BPS, 1960: 175).

Fierce competition among various shipping companies (the KPM, PELNI and private Indonesian shipping companies) occurred mainly on the Singapore lines. Since the Indonesian revolutionary years (1945-1949), the Singapore routes had been the most advantageous and the city acted as the major trading centre in Southeast Asia. In the 1950s, Singapore increasingly became the trading centre for the Indonesian archipelago and the main commodities were rice, tin ore, coal and salt. The competition strongly affected the KPM, especially after the PELNI and the Indonesian private shipping companies and the Singapore-based fleet reduced their freight rates to comply with government regulation. The KPM used to be under the Dutch protection but it lost Dutch favour in this period. The KPM was forced to keep its official rate as regulated by the Indonesian government, while the PELNI and other Indonesian private shipping companies could easily reduce rates without government censure, despite KPM complaints. That is why although the KPM had bigger and better equipped vessels, it could not compete with the PELNI and other Indonesian shipping companies. In addition, the latter could easily deviate from their obligatory routes by getting a permission letter from the Department of Shipping.

The PELNI and other shipping companies transported both official goods and unlisted cargoes which were not taxed. They could introduce a tariff reduction of 20 per cent for Singapore routes. The KPM on the other hand, was too disciplined to carry out such illicit activities. This was in part why the PELNI became increasingly important in serving the Singapore routes. In 1953, PELNI's and the KPM's share in transporting goods to Singapore were 6,000 tons and 249,000 tons respectively. In 1956, PELNI's share increased to 112,000 tons (eighteen fold), while the KPM's share decreased to 237,000 tons (Dick, 1987: 19-23).

Under such circumstances, the only way for the KPM to win the competition was its professionalism. Sticking to an accurate schedule, the KPM aimed to be the only trusted shipping company in Indonesia. Through its established connections with international shipping companies, the KPM wanted to dominate transshipment cargo from producing areas to international markets. Considering that the PELNI did not stick to its serving schedule most of the time, the KPM raised this as an obstacle to PELNI's joining the international freight conference (the before-war BVC). After a long negotiation, PELNI was finally admitted as a member in 1954. Competition between the PELNI and the KPM thus also occurred in transshipment cargoes.

The Indonesian government put pressure on those who hampered the development of PELNI and other Indonesian shipping companies. In the second half of the 1950s the government put pressure on the KPM and its networks, including Dutch international companies, such as the Stoomvaart-Maatschappij 'Nederlands' (SMN) and Rotterdamsche Lloyd (RL).<sup>7</sup> The KPM also co-operated with Dutch export and import companies, known as the 'Big Five': 'Internatio', 'Borsumij', 'Jacoberg' (Firma Jacobson van den Berg), 'Lindeteves Stokvis', and 'Geo. Wehry' (Sutter, 1959: 95). Those 'big five' established cargo-handling companies in almost every important port; they even constructed their own quays at ports. As a newcomer in the shipping world, it was very difficult for the PELNI to enter the established Dutch network. To cut the network between the foreign trading and the foreign shipping companies, the Indonesian government took over all cargo-handling companies in Indonesia and let the Indonesians become involved in this business (Soelaiman, 1959: 40) so they were no longer merely onlookers. To this purpose, the P.P. (Peraturan Pemerintah/ Government Regulation) No. 61/ 1954 was issued. This regulation prescribed a separation of functions between sea transportation and cargo-handling transport at the port that should be handled by Indonesian companies. It is clear that the regulation's main objective was to eliminate foreign domination both in shipping and in cargo-handling business at the Indonesian port.

The government policy was aimed at giving more opportunities to the PELNI and other Indonesian private shipping and trading companies so that they may play a more active role in port business. Later, the PELNI had no longer difficulties in loading and unloading cargoes or in getting cargoes for the interislands trade. The PP No. 61/1954 was a structural effort to cut the monopolistic network of foreign companies. Due to this regulation, the KPM and other foreign shipping companies began to depend on Indonesian companies, especially in cargo-handling works at port. Obviously, the PELNI had the advantage of government back up to compete with the KPM. Although this policy seriously affected their business networks, the KPM was aware that their companies were becoming inefficient due to various strikes relating to the political condition in Indonesia.

The post-colonial period witnessed the Indonesian government's effort to establish a strong state-owned shipping company to replace the KPM in Indonesia. At first the Indonesian government tried to take over the KPM through a long set of negotiations. As the

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<sup>7</sup> Indonesia also had a similar pattern of cooperation between domestic and international shipping through the establishment of international shipping companies such as PN Djakarta Lloyd in 1952 and followed by P.T. Gesuri Lloyd, PT Samudera Indonesia, P.T. Trikora Lloyd, and P.T. Kara

negotiations failed to produce an agreement, the government proposed to set up a joint Indonesian shipping company retaining the name KPM. This was also unsuccessful. Then the Indonesian government decided to reduce the KPM's role and its networks in Indonesia to the benefit of the PELNI.<sup>8</sup> Besides, tariff regulation and routes served by the KPM restrained the PELNI expansion (*Bahtera Ampera* 2, 1963: 6). In contrast, the Indonesian government often did not take serious action against PELNI violations, which was an indirectly disadvantage to the KPM. Business logic had been replaced by the logic of power. The PELNI was actually incomparable with the KPM. However the Indonesian government overstated their rivalry, since their underlying motive was more a show of state sovereignty than business considerations.

The acknowledgement of Indonesian sovereignty in December 1949 had not settled all problems of the two countries, particularly as the Dutch government kept its sovereignty over West-Papua. The Dutch government asked the RL and the SMN to sail to West Papua eight times per year, while the KPM had fortnightly voyages to this province connecting with Singapore (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 2291). The Round Table Agreement stated that the West Papua question was to be solved within one year after the Dutch acknowledgement of the Indonesian sovereignty. Indonesian nationalists thought that the hand over would be accomplished in the end of 1950. In fact, it took much longer. During this 'psycho-war' period, the Indonesian-Dutch relationship became strained and coloured by distrust.<sup>9</sup> In the meantime, the Dutch always tried to attract sympathy from Papua's people and connected them to the international network. The Dutch wanted to show that they handled West Papua seriously.<sup>10</sup>

Tension in the relationship between the Indonesian and Dutch governments ran high when in the early 1950s Indonesia accused the Dutch of supporting the *Republik Maluku Selatan* (RMS or Republic of South Maluku) separatist movement. Unavoidably, the Indonesian government again highlighted the KPM, as a symbol of Dutch colonial

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Line. On the development of an Indonesian international shipping fleet since 1959 (Indonesian National Shipowners Association Unsur Pelayaran Samudera, 1974).

<sup>8</sup> Government Regulation No. 61 of 1954 did not allow shipping companies to handle their own cargoes and expedition. The regulation also stipulated that the capital and management should be in Indonesian hands. It is clear that this regulation was intended to sever cooperation between the KPM and other Dutch trading companies (Dewan Vemal, 1970: 9).

<sup>9</sup> It was rather odd that on 7 September 1951, in his visit to Bangka, president Sukarno used the KPM's ship MS de 'Ophir' and returned to Jakarta by MS 'Merak'. The Indonesian flag was flown on the bow, while the Dutch flag was flown in the stern. This situation did not indicate the conflict between the two countries in the case of West Papua (NA: KPM/KJCPL, Inv. no. 675).

sovereignty, especially its activities in the eastern part of Indonesia (NA: KPM/KJCPL, Inv. no. 80). The Indonesian government suspected that the KPM supplied firearms to the rebels, so Indonesian army did not hesitate to scrutinise KPM ships sailing to the eastern part of Indonesia. In 1950, the Indonesian government cancelled the KPM's Jakarta-Sorong route via Makassar and Ambon (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 9605). Eventually, the Maluku islands were intentionally isolated from the outer world (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 9605).<sup>11</sup>

The KPM realised that its epoch was coming an end. The Dutch colonial government could no longer hold a monopoly in domestic shipping in the Archipelago, as had been expressed: *'ons natuurlijk mandaat als alleenvervoerders in den Archipel'* (*our natural mandate as the only transporter in the Archipelago*) (À Campo, 1992: 6). The KPM was treated as a 'favoured child' by the Dutch colonial government. As a private shipping company, the KPM had actually been deeply involved in the politics of the Dutch colonial government. From the beginning it was established not only for business but also to serve the political interests of that government. Unfortunately, such an image persisted after the fall of the colonial state. During the Indonesia-Dutch conflict contesting West Papua, the KPM stood awkwardly between its Dutch former patron and the Indonesian government. This certainly did not guarantee its future in the Archipelago.<sup>12</sup>

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
<sup>10</sup> In 1962, the KPM served the line from West Papua to Europe transshipping both cargo and passengers in Singapore.

<sup>11</sup> In June 1950, the KPM's 'Van Riemsdijk', which undertook regular voyages between Singapore and Sorong, also experienced difficulties. Being suspected of transporting 'colonialists' to West Papua, the ship was plundered at Tanjung Priok (Jakarta) and was also robbed at Tanjung Perak (Surabaya). The robbers raided the passengers and crews' baggage. The police came too late. But for the investigation, the passengers were gathered at embarkation room and not allowed to go outside the port because they did not have a visa to enter Indonesian territory. After long negotiations, some of the passengers were allowed to go to West Papua by plane, but the rest remained in embarkation room until the investigation was completed (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 9606). The arrival of the 'Van Riemsdijk' also caused trouble in Makassar (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 9605). The 'Modjokerto' that sailed regularly to Sorong experienced almost similar treatment. In Balikpapan, the ship was searched two times by the local government to inspect *'wapens munitie die naar Nieuw Guinea zouden werden gesmokkeld'* ('weapon ammunition that would be smuggled to New Guinea') (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 9605). The police carried out the first investigation and the customs and military police the second. They found nothing (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 9605). Rumours spread that firearms were smuggled into West Papua via the Philippines by Myer Schwartz (an American adventurer), so that President Sukarno sent a delegation to Manila to investigate this problem (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 10084). Washington did not admit to having intelligence reports concerning smuggling arms to West Papua (NA: MKO, Inv. no. 10084).

<sup>12</sup> By the time the conflict had reached its peak, the KPM had been expelled from Indonesia and promptly took the Dutch side by transporting Dutch troops and military equipment to West Papua. Sorong became the base of Dutch power. On 8 October 1962, about 150 troops in Merauke were replaced to Sorong, 175 troops from Fak Fak on 15 October 1962, and 205 soldiers from Kaimana on 22 October 1962 (NA: KPM/KJCPL, Inv. no. 675).

Undeniably, the Indonesian government still needed KPM services up until its expulsion. Transportation of goods and passengers was still dominated by this company as seen in Figure 1.


**Figure 1.**  
**Interisland goods transported by the KPM and the PELNI, 1953-1956**  
**(thousands tons)**



Source: BPS, *Statistical Pocketbook 1959*. A.K. Jaelani, 'Lintasan perkembangan angkutan laut dari masa ke masa', *Dunia Maritim* 9 (1974) 46.

The Figure 1 shows that the share of the PELNI in transporting goods in the interislands shipping continually increased, but the KPM was still dominant. In 1956, for example, the share of the KPM was still 75 per cent. The share of the KPM in the domestic passenger transport can be seen in Figure 2. This figure shows that the share of the PELNI in interislands passenger transport was far smaller than that of the KPM. This is because from the beginning the KPM fleet was prepared not only for goods transport but also for passengers of economy class, even deck passengers, as well as luxurious classes with much better services. But the cost of maintaining passenger ships was higher than those of carrier ships, which explains why there were fewer shipping companies operating passenger ships on Indonesian waters.

**Figure 2.**  
**Interisland passenger transport by the KPM and the PELNI, 1953-1957**  
**(thousands)**



Source: BPS, *Statistical Pocketbook 1959*, 175. See also A. Kadir Jaelani, 'Lintasan perkembangan', *Dunia Maritim* 9 (1974) 46.

#### IV. PELNI 1957-1964: Sacrifice for State Interest

Although generally during 1957 some KPM officials' optimism concerning the future of the company persisted, the political situation relating to the West Papua dispute changed rapidly.<sup>13</sup> The KPM's local directors began to feel uneasy. There was a left-wing strike which involved the Indonesian personnel of the KPM (*Harian Rakyat* 17 May 1957). On 3 December 1957, they took over the KPM central office in Jakarta.<sup>14</sup> Although, in the beginning, the government denied its involvement in this matter, it did not take any step to restrain these actions. On 6 December 1957, the Minister of Communication announced his approval of the take over of the KPM (Dick, 1987: 24). Unlike other foreign companies, the KPM could not be fully nationalised because its officials in Jakarta immediately spread the information to all KPM ships' captains to make the ships safe from possible attack.

Nationalisation of Dutch companies in Indonesia raised both pros and cons, despite the fact that the aggressive political mass-action that encouraged the process of nationalisation

<sup>13</sup> Since November 1957, the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia/ Indonesian Communist Party) newspaper 'Harian Rakyat' increasingly encouraged action to take over the KPM (*Harian Rakyat* 18 November 1957). This is in line with President Sukarno's speech spoken in Surabaya on 11 November 1957. He warned that Indonesian people would confiscate (*menyita*) all Dutch assets in Indonesia if the Dutch does not hand over West Papua to Indonesia during the meeting carried out by General Assembly of the UNO (United Nations Organization) starting on 18 November 1957 (*Suara Rakyat* 12 November 1957; *Abadi* 30 November 1957).

<sup>14</sup> Some Indonesian seamen of the KPM even took over the ships. Until 9 December 1957, it was reported that there were 11 ships taken over by Indonesians (*Harian Rakyat* 4 December 1957;

was out of control. The government did nothing but approve such actions. Government Regulation No. 45/1959 states that all Dutch-owned maritime companies in Indonesia were to be nationalised.<sup>15</sup> The regulation was put into effect 3 December 1957. Due to difficulties in implementation, only the KPM was expelled from Indonesia. In this way, the KPM's domination of Indonesian waters came to an end after more than half a century. The government did not allow to the KPM to operate its fleet on Indonesia waters (Minister Decree No. 13/PM/KB/1958, *Warta Ekonomi* 21/22, 31 May 1958, 262). This policy had to be paid costly, i.e. the collapse of the KPM as one of the most basic forces leading towards the economic integration of the Archipelago (Mackie, 1999: 2; Sulistiyono, 2003).

After the expulsion of the KPM, problems soon emerged. The KPM left about 16,000 functionaries and workers in Indonesia, but no ships.<sup>16</sup> They were transferred to the PELNI, which demanded that more funds were needed to pay those salaries.<sup>17</sup> Following the expulsion of the KPM, there was a deficiency of shipping space. This could be overcome at short notice by the PELNI and private shipping companies and by giving dispensation to foreign-flagged ships, or by chartering foreign ships mainly from Singapore and Hong Kong, or by buying second-hand ships from Russia, Japan, Italy, and East European countries (IBRD, 1971: Annex A, 2). After the KPM was expelled, the service quality in interisland shipping gradually decreased. The spirit of keeping the interislands shipping in Indonesia's own hands was, in fact, costly.<sup>18</sup>

The expulsion of the KPM from Indonesia waters did not automatically preconditioned the PELNI to be the leading shipping company Indonesia. This state-owned company had to solve problems stemming from the mushrooming private shipping companies.<sup>19</sup> To avoid

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*Harian Rakyat* 9 December 1957.). PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia/ Indonesian Communist Party*) involved in this campaign (*Suara Rakyat* 4 December 1957).

<sup>15</sup> This included NV Nederland-Indonesië Steenkolen-Handel Maatschappij (NISHM) Tanjung Priok, NV Vereenigde Prauwenveeren (VPV) Jakarta, Nederlandsche Indonesische Scheepvaart Establishment (NISE) Tanjung Priok, NV Droogdok Maatschappij Tanjung Priok, NV Radio Holland Jakarta, NV Industriële Maatschappij Palembang (IMP), NV Semarang Dockworks, NV Droogdok Maatschappij Surabaya, see NA: KPM/KJCPL, Inv. no. 1138.

<sup>16</sup> Before World War II, the KPM had 6.400 Indonesian workers, 900 Chinese, and 800 Europeans (Allen & Donnitheorne: 221).

<sup>17</sup> According to KPM documents: in 1953 the PELNI experienced a financial lost of 6 million rupiahs, in 1954 it was 15 million rupiahs and the next year an estimated 23 million rupiahs (NA: KPM/KJCPL, Inv. no. 1138).

<sup>18</sup> After the expulsion of the KPM, almost all tonnage of interislands shipping was in hand of Indonesian companies only (Hengst, 1997: 36).

<sup>19</sup> The emergence of private shipping companies in Indonesia related to the KPM's effort to stimulate its feeder shipping during the revolution. For its own interests, the KPM sponsored the establishment of several feeder-shiping companies, such as the NOCEMO and the MKSS. Even the

claims that they were a monopolistic company as the KPM had been, the government and the PELNI approached private shipping companies. In April and May 1954, the government sponsored a tripartite meeting involving the Department of Communication, the Parliament, and the shipping companies (the PELNI and private shipping companies were represented by UPPI/ Uni Perusahaan Pelayaran Indonesia).<sup>20</sup> The meeting resulted in a compromise in which private shipping companies understood the PELNI presence, as a state-owned company that should be used to replace the position of the KPM on trunk lines. Private shipping companies would operate its fleets as feeder lines to be regulated by a rayon system.<sup>21</sup> The government promised to assist private shipping companies by encouraging a long-term hire/purchase of 16 PELNI ships for private shipping companies. This meant that the PELNI did not only perform as a commercial institution but also as the 'parent company' of private shipping companies. To reduce the KPM's role on Indonesian waters and to draw foreign investors, the Indonesian government promised to create favourable conditions for foreign capital investment especially in the shipping sector. Reasonably, such a policy warned the KPM, which was reluctant in negotiations with the Indonesian government (*Algemeen Handelsblad* 24 December 1953).

Although the rayon system seemed quite fair to those private shipping companies engaging in interregional shipping in Indonesia, this system, in fact, existed on paper only. Except in the eastern part of Indonesia, the flow of goods from small ports did not go directly to surrounding major ports in the rayon concerned, so traders preferred to do business in

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PELNI actually originated from the SGS, which was established by the Dutch government. Although the establishment of the PELNI was aimed to compete with the KPM in the trunk lines, the private shipping companies felt their interests being threatened. Private shipping companies saw the PELNI as the predecessor of the PEPUSKA, which mainly functioned as a facilitator. After the PELNI took over the PEPUSKA, private shipping companies saw that the PELNI actually was a new commercial institution. Therefore, they had to consider PELNI a rival and no longer a facilitator, especially in the trunk lines. Besides, private shipping companies were not happy with PELNI, since it swallowed up government subsidies for sea transportation.

<sup>20</sup> Companies in the UPPI were PT PERINDO (Manado), PT PEMAL (Ambon), PT PPSS (Makassar), PT PERPELIN (Surabaya), PT MPM (Jakarta), PT SANG SAKA (Jakarta), PT KARIMATA (Pontianak), PT KALIMANTAN (Banjarmasin); in the meantime members of PERPEPSI were PT PEPANA, PT BINTANG MALUKU, PT INDONESIA FORTUNE LLOYD, PT MPS, PT PEDJAKA, and PT NAGAH BERLIAN. UPPI was established in 1953 as a response of the establishment of the PELNI and functioned as a commercial shipping company (DPP INSA, 1984: 2).

<sup>21</sup> In the rayon system, shipping route was based on the resort of shipping. A shipping rayon was centred at one major port surrounded by several small ports regarded as feeder ports. There were 11 shipping rayons and their major ports, i.e. North Sumatra (Oleleue), East Sumatra (Belawan), West Sumatra (Padang), Riau (Tanjung Pinang), West Java/South Sumatra (Jakarta), Central Java (Semarang), West and South Kalimantan (Samarinda), East Java Nusa Tenggara (Surabaya), South Sulawesi (Makassar), North Sulawesi (Manado), and Maluku (Ambon) (Dick, 1987: 17).

Singapore and/or in Penang. Since the Chinese ships were not included in this system they could freely voyage to any ports they wanted, making the indigenous shipping companies envy them, which led to the rayon system's demise. In 1957, the rayon system was replaced by the *lijnen system* (liner system) and the restrictions requiring private shipping companies to sail outside its specified rayon was nullified (Dick, 1987: 18).

Following its expulsion, the KPM's legacy created many problems that had to be sorted out between the PELNI and private Indonesian shipping companies. Again, the private shipping companies felt that their interests were threatened by the PELNI. They witnessed the PELNI service of shipping routes usually served by private shipping companies acting as a feeder fleet. But beginning in 1963, private shipping companies involved themselves in trunk lines together with the PELNI. This was a result of the considerable development of the private shipping fleet as seen in Table 2. This table shows a considerable increase in Indonesian private shipping companies. From 1957 to 1962, the number of private shipping companies increased about 240 per cent, while its tonnage increased 313 per cent.

**Table 2.**  
**The development of the private shipping fleet, 1957-1963**

Year	PELNI		Private shipping companies	
	Number of ships	DWT	Number of ships	DWT
1957	41	49,424	84	49,911
1958	55	96,033	87	52,839
1959	73	144,837	133	96,534
1960	60	170,956	169	127,279
1961	65	224,928	208	186,606
1962	75	232,884	201	156,681
1963	-	244,197	-	202,848

Source : Departemen Perhubungan Laut, *Departemen Perhubungan*, 50.  
See also Departemen Perhubungan Laut, *Ulasan Sejarah*, 47-48.

This increase was linked closely with the government's policy to stimulate the growth of private shipping companies to make up for the lack of shipping space following the KPM's expulsion. The government realised that without private shipping companies' participation, the government (PELNI) would not have been able to overcome this problem. But this program went too far. The growth of private shipping companies was uncontrolled and

exceeded the actual need. The development of the number of interislands companies can be seen in Table 3.

**Table 3.**  
**Number of shipping companies in Indonesian shipping, 1952-1963**

Year	Number	
	Interislands shipping company	International shipping company
1952	6	2
1957	44	14
1958	52	43
1959	107	49
1960	105	49
1961	88	49
1962	100	50
1963	107	62

Source: Departemen Perhubungan Laut, *Ulasan sejarah*, 40-50.

Table 3 shows that the number of Indonesian interislands shipping companies increased rapidly. In one decade, this increased was 16-fold, from 6 companies in 1952 became 100 companies in 1962. Those in international shipping companies also experienced a similar development. In connection with the development of interislands trade in Indonesia, the above table also indicates that competition among interislands shipping companies in Indonesia were not always efficient. This depended on whether there was healthy competition and on the government's capability to control and uphold the rules of the competition. Too many competitors outside control could cause inefficiency and create a deteriorating economic state of affairs. Finally, some shipping companies were not able to buy spare parts for ships that would otherwise increase inefficiency. This meant that more than 25 per cent of these ships' productive time was spent docking and on repairs (the figure actually should be 7%). This problem was not only faced by private shipping companies but was also by PELNI as a state shipping company (Departemen Perhubungan, 1963: 11).

The PELNI even had to face harder problems in connection with its function as a state shipping company which had to serve government interests in the fields of military operations, promoting of trade, transmigration, etc. During the anti-PRRI/PERMESTA movement campaign (1957/1958), more than 25 per cent of PELNI's ships were used by Indonesian Naval for military operations, while during the Western Papua campaign (1962), about 42 per cent of its fleet was militarized for the interest of TNI operations. Besides, about 36 per cent of its fleet was chartered by TNI for transporting of military supplies. In the

meantime, during the Crush Malaysia campaign (1963-1966), about 25 per cent of the PELNI's ships were used for military purposes. During the military operations, these ships were never docked so that they were in poor condition when returned to the PELNI (Sulistiyono, 2003: 268).

The differences in economic resources among regions and islands of the Indonesian archipelago led to a situation which stimulated uneven economic development of the regions. Developed regions would be more frequently called by ships than the less economically developed regions. It gave an impact that the developed regions to undergo more progress, whereas the less developed regions did not immediately attain a considerable progress. In this connection the motto 'shipping follow the trade' prevails here. If the trade does not develop, transport intensification will be economically inefficient. Equally, trade potential will attract those in transportation business to invest their capital. In the meantime, the early shipping, usually pioneered by the government, served primarily political aims. The government had to keep the principle of 'trade follows the shipping' to sustain economic growth of potentially rich areas. In addition to its function as a state shipping company, PELNI had to carry out its 'holly duty' to operate its fleet in unprofitable lines on isolated regions which rarely done by private ships. In 1963 for example, the PELNI had to sail more than 40 per cent of thin lines (unprofitable lines) or about 15 of 37 lines. In these line, this state company had to face financial lost (Departemen Perhubungan, 1963: 123). Besides, the PELNI's ships also had to serve government program on transmigration from Java to the Outer Islands which only gave a little net earnings. These still do not include tariff system issued by the government which regulated PELNI in fixing the transport rate (Departemen Perhubungan, 1963: 98).

Difficulties faced by the PELNI during the first half of the 1960s also relates with the deteriorating process of Indonesian economy in general. The early 1960s witnessed a rapid growth in interisland shipping, in tonnage and number, following the governmental policies allowing shipping companies to charter foreign ships. The government also put a liberal policy into practice which established new shipping companies after the expulsion of the KPM in 1957. Some such companies had their own ships or chartered foreign ones, but many of them existed in name only. The growing private shipping companies, which did not have their own ships, meant that foreign exchange was flowing abroad because they had to charter foreign ships and let them to operate on Indonesian waters.<sup>22</sup> In the meantime, since 1961, the need for an interisland shipping fleet reached a saturation point compared to the volume of

interisland trade itself. In 1964, the tonnage of the interregional fleet had exceeded the that of 1957 when the KPM still operated its fleet on Indonesian waters, i.e. 300,000 BRT compared to 400,000 BRT (Dick, 1987: 28). The volume of interregional trade increased: about 6 million tons in 1957 compared to about 6.5 million tons (Departemen Perhubungan, 1965: 35-42). The imbalance between the increase of fleet tonnage and productivity reflected in trade volume created the problem of in-efficiency.<sup>23</sup>

The expansion of foreign-chartered ships also caused shipping companies to neglect their own ships' maintenance. Company's were also unable to buy spare ship parts, which led to a significant decrease in carrying capacity. The fact that intense competition was not accompanied by government control led to a violation of existing schedules, deviations from intended ports of call, and tax avoidance and thus financial losses to the government (Dick, 1987: 23-27).

Based on the research of the Directorate General of Sea Communications, it was noted that between 1961 and 1969, 86 selected vessels were utilised for an average of 6 years without docking. The effect of failing to dock was manifested in the excessive corrosion of the underwater parts of the vessels. In tropical waters, the underwater parts of a vessel will be adequately protected from corrosion by paint and anodes for about one year after dry-docking. Irregular dry-docking will cause irreparable corrosion. The engine as well as cargo-gear machinery suffered equally from lack of maintenance (Departemen Perhubungan, 1970: 11).

The bad condition of port facilities, such as cargo handling equipment and quay also added to inefficiency. Ships had to spend more time at port for cargo handling and for administrative matters. Due to the poor conditions of port facilities in general, the unproductive time spent by ships increased to approximately 25 per cent of their commission days (Indonesian National Shipowners Association, 1968: 8). This did not include the low productivity of port labourers which might force a vessel stay at port even longer (Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan PT PELNI, 1976: 65-70). Table 4 surveys the time spent in ports on loading and unloading cargo, including idle time spent waiting for pilots, shifting cargo, on maintenance and repairing and docking.

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<sup>22</sup> In 1960, for example, Indonesia had to pay £ 2,375,390/ month for chartering 44 ships of 133,710 DWT (Departemen Perhubungan Laut, 1960, 55).

<sup>23</sup> The carrying capacity of the Indonesian fleet in 1958 was 12.5 tons per DWT per year in 1958. This became 6.2 tons on average per DWT per year in 1963 (Departement Perhubungan Laut, 1964: 10).

**Table 4.**

**Idle time of the PELNI's vessels, 1962-1964**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Sea time (in %)</b>	<b>Port time (in %)</b>	<b>Idling for docking (in %)</b>
1962	24	50	26
1963	23	46	31
1964	19	24	57

Source: Indonesian Shipowners Association, *The outlook*, 8.

In connection with the declining performance of the PELNI, Etherington identifies five things as causal factors: 1) Instead of three weeks in normal time, PELNI ships had to spend three months (25 per cent of the year) in 1963 for docking and repairs. 2) Two-third of port time or about four months (33 per cent of the year) were spent for idle in port awaiting cargo handling, fresh water supplies, clearance, etc. 3) Even when cargo was being handled, the rate was about 60 per cent lower than previously normal rates. 4) Sea time was about 10 per cent greater because of fouled bottoms and the disappearance or failure of navigational aids. 5) Load factors had fallen from an acceptable 60 per cent to about 35 per cent because of excessively large and badly routed ships (Etherington, 1959; Dick, 1975: 26; Ali, 1966: 27-51). In the mid-1960s, the government realised such conditions threatened both the existing productivity of interisland shipping and the Indonesian economy in general. The government began to think that uncontrolled development of domestic shipping should be ended but this paper does not intent to discuss this matter.

## **V. Concluding remarks**

*Indonesianisasi* of foreign enterprises is one of the most crucial phenomena in Indonesia history during the period of 1950s. It was not only a political matter but also had economic implications. Since revolution era, Indonesian government strongly intended to establish a strong state owned shipping company. At the beginning, the KPM was viewed as one of the Dutch colonial legacies in Indonesia that should be taken over by the Indonesian government. At first, this was done gradually through a set of negotiations, but this was unsuccessful. The failure of the negotiations motivated the Indonesian government to reduce the KPM's role and its networks in Indonesia for the benefit of the new national shipping company. Although the Indonesian government still allowed the KPM to operate in Indonesia, the establishment of PELNI reflected the policy of replacing this company on the Indonesian waters. This ensured the competition between the two companies, which operated their fleets in trunk lines. Under the banner of nationalism, the PELNI had a greater chance to win the competition since it had strong support from the Indonesian government. But in fact, in this shadow of nationalism

too, the PELNI had face so many difficulties causing this state-owned company could not be the leading shipping enterprise in Indonesia, even after the expulsion of the KPM in 1957.

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## APPENDIX 1.

### LIST OF SHIPS MILITARIZED FOR TRIKORA CAMPAIGN, 1962

No.	Name of ship	DWT	Sign number	Owner
1.	Km. Selat Bangka	588.94	AL 3 b	PN PELNI
2.	Km. Selat Bali	590.60	AL 4 b	PN PELNI
3.	Km. Tolado	2.230.00	AL 5 b	PN PELNI
4.	Km. Tomako	2.230.00	AL 6 b	PN PELNI
5.	Km. Karang Raya	3.587.44	AL 7 b	PN PELNI
6.	Km. Selajar	4.200.00	AL 8 b	PN PELNI
7.	Km. Wandebori	2.344.60	AL 9 b	PN PELNI
8.	Km. Gunung Tambora	5.000.00	AL 10 b	PN PELNI
9.	Km. Sawu	4.200.00	AL 11 b	PN PELNI
10.	Km. Tembatu	2.230.00	AL 12 c	PN PELNI
11.	Km. Togaran	2.230.00	AL 13 c	PN PELNI
12.	Km. Watampone	2.344.60	AL 14 c	PN PELNI
13.	Km. Karata	2.395.42	AL 15 c	PN PELNI
14.	Km. Kangean	2.252.00	AL 16 c	PN PELNI
15.	Km. Selat Madura	584.01	AL 17 c	PN PELNI
16.	Km. Karimata	1.462.59	AL 18 c	PN PELNI
17.	Km. Berau	1.630.00	AL 19 c	PN PELNI
18.	Km. Bengawan	1.630.00	AL 20 c	PN PELNI
19.	Km. Batanghari	1.630.00	AL 21 c	PN PELNI
20.	Km. Tampomas	4.950.00	AL 22 c	PN PELNI
21.	Km. Brantas	1.630.00	AL 23 c	PN PELNI
22.	Km. Tjokroaminoto	10.000.00	AL 26 d	PN PELNI
23.	Km. Thamrin	10.000.00	AL 27 d	PN PELNI
24.	Km. Ketapang	2.466.34	AL 28 d	PN PELNI
25.	Km. Sang Serawai	1.500.00	AL 29 d	PT Sang Saka
26.	Km. Rambang	3.340.00	AL 30 d	PT Sriwijaya Raya Lines
27.	Km. Pasaman	2.000.00	AL 31 d	PT Pelumin
28.	Km. Lucky Fortune	6.685.00	AL 32 d	PT Indonesia Fortune Lloyd
29.	Km. Sangihe	4.200.00	AL 33 d	PN PELNI
30.	Km. Tanjung Batu	3.100.00		PN PELNI
31.	Km. Tanjung Sele	3.100.00		PN PELNI
32.	Km. Tanjung Sepi	3.100.00		PN PELNI
33.	Km. Gunung Guntur	5.000.00		PN Djakarta Lloyd
	Total	103.230.00		

Source: Departemen Perhubungan Laut, *Laporan Tahunan Departemen Perhubungan Laut Masa 1963* (Jakarta: 1963), 210-211.

**APPENDIX 2.**  
**LIST OF SHIPS CHARTERED INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT FOR**  
**TRIKORACAMPAIGN**

No.	Name of ship	DWT	Owner
1.	Km. Sangihe	4.200.00	PN PELNI
2.	Km. Selat Karimata	1.462.00	PN PELNI
3.	Km. Selat Sunda	391.81	PN PELNI
4.	Km. Km. Batanghari	1.630.00	PN PELNI
5.	Km. Bengawan	1.630.00	PN PELNI
6.	Km. Selat Lombok	384.01	PN PELNI
7.	Km. Berau	1.630.00	PN PELNI
8.	Km. Togaran	2.230.00	PN PELNI
9.	Km. Selat makassar	1.456.77	PN PELNI
10.	Km. Selat Sumba	582.19	PN PELNI
11.	Km. Warisano	2.344.00	PN PELNI
12.	Km. Wakolo	2.344.00	PN PELNI
13.	Km. Tampomas	4.950.00	PN PELNI
14.	Km. Halmahera	2.386.00	PN PELNI
15.	Km. Brantas	1.630.00	PN PELNI
16.	Km. Watudambo	2.344.00	PN PELNI
17.	Km. Kamara	2.397.67	PN PELNI
18.	Km. Larat	575.00	PN PELNI
19.	Km. Laponda	575.00	PN PELNI
20.	Km. Lawin	6.575.00	PN PELNI
21.	Km. Tanjung Raya	3.100.00	PN PELNI
22.	Km. Esau	720.00	PN PELNI
23.	Km. Bogowonto	1.630.00	PN PELNI
24.	Km. Kapoposang	2.402.90	PN PELNI
25.	Km. Ambulombo	5.190.00	PN PELNI
26.	Km. Gunung Djati	6.390.00	PN PELNI
27.	Km. Endeh	720.00	PN PELNI
28.	Km. Sapudi	4.200.00	PN PELNI
29.	Km. Empoh	720.00	PN PELNI
30.	Km. Selat Madura	584.01	PN PELNI
31.	Km. Karata	2.395.42	PN PELNI
32.	Km. Djja Dwitya	8.750.00	PN Djakarta Lloyd
33.	Km. Tyr	2.687.06	PT Pedjaka
34.	Km. Sorong	3.200.00	PT Bahari Lloyd
35.	Km. Gunung Kerintji	5.000.00	PN Djakarta Lloyd
<b>Total</b>		<b>89.306.84</b>	

Source: Departemen Perhubungan Laut, *Laporan Tahunan Departemen Perhubungan Laut Masa 1963* (Jakarta: 1963), 211.

### APPENDIX 3.

#### SITUATION OF FLEET IN INDONESIA, DECEMBER 1963

##### 1. Domestic shipping:

No.	Company	Number of ship	DWT
1.	PN PELNI	87	149,181.84
2.	Private company	240	152,201.09
3.	KOTOE (Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi)	3	5,444.00
4.	Confiscated foreign ships	11	13,708.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>341</b>	<b>320,534.93</b>

##### 2. International shipping

No.	Company	Number of ship	DWT
1.	PN Djakarta Lloyd	10	77,930.000
2.	Private shipping companies	1	9,131.00
3.	KOTOE (Komando Tertinggi Operasi Ekonomi)	4	11,141.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>15</b>	<b>98,202.00</b>

Source: Departemen Perhubungan Laut, *Laporan Tahunan Departemen Perhubungan Laut Masa 1963* (Jakarta: 1963), 212.

### APPENDIX 4.

#### LIST OF CONFISCATED SHIPS DURING THE MALAYSIA CONFRONTATION

No.	Name of ship	DWT
1.	Km. Danakil	4,624.00
2.	Km. Hailona	1,645.00
3.	Km. Sri Seria	220.00
4.	Km. Hai Soon	427.00
5.	Km. Hai Teck Ann	600.00
6.	Km. Chiat Hin	650.00
7.	Km. Kik Tae Pe	612.00
8.	Km. Luen Hwa	650.00
9.	Km. Lam An	600.00
10.	Km. Pulau Pinang	2,350.00
11.	Km. Floreta	1,330.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>13,708.00</b>

Source: Departemen Perhubungan Laut, *Laporan Tahunan Departemen Perhubungan Laut Masa 1963* (Jakarta: 1963), 222.