

INDONESIANISASI OF THE RURAL INDUSTRY IN MOYUDAN, YOGYAKARTA, 1945-1967

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The term of *Indonesianisasi* has wide meaning politically or economically. This paper is investigating the economic side of *Indonesianisasi* especially from the perspective of people's experiences from the past during the colonial to the recent time after the independence in relation to the emergence of rural industry. The history context brings light on alternative meaning of *Indonesianisasi*, especially historical movement of people's economy in surviving effort. Further analysis on this research takes chronological line of historian thought. First, exploring the early rural Industrialization in Java specifically Yogyakarta, Second is giving the description of the growth of local people enterprises of the Yogyakarta village on weaving industry, and the third is analysis of *Indonesianisasi* in the context of macro economic policy influencing the local enterprises, in this case the traditional weaving industry of Moyudan.

Early Rural Industrialization in Yogyakarta

As the social and historical background in Java, it is important to see the past economic development in Java, under the Dutch colonialism, especially since the emergence of planting industrialization in Java. In fact, the essence of the colonialism is the exploitation of the economic profit. The term appearing is *resources drain* or the transportation of natural resources in the colonized area to the colonizing country. Peter Boomgard in his book, *Anak Jajahan Belanda Sejarah Sosial Ekonomi Jawa 1795-1880*, gives a more detailed illustration about Javanese social economic history in relation to the Javanese economic development in the 19th century. The increase of the industrialization of commerce crops was the effort of the colonial policy to improve the revenue because of VOC's lost. It was proved by the emergence of the policy of the Governor General, Van Den Bosch to apply obligatory planting system (*Cultuurstelsel*) that gave a great surplus for the colonialist. The study done by Peter Boomgard actually tries to see the demographic development of Javanese society. In 19 century, Javanese people experienced a rapid development. It is questionable because part of the Javanese people only worked in agricultural sector. On the other hand, at that period of time, the land rent was very high (*lendrente*). Even they were forced to work at the coffee, nila, and sugar cane plantation developed by the colonial government. In his study, Boomgard explains some of his basic assumptions as follows:

First, although in 1815-1880 the majority of the Javanese people worked in agricultural sector, there were more people in the village dealing with other sectors instead of agriculture as their additional income. Second, during that period, the production of the local and supra local markets were the important element of agricultural products. Third, as the production activity as for the market, the exchange from goods to money became more common. Fourth, as the production was for the market, people developed a broader relation with society outside their village. Fifth, there was a clear social stratification that caused social conflict. Sixth, a village elite that was inherited from the previous elite to another continuously governed the society. Seventh, although in 1800s there were some corporation element in the village, but it was not until the next ten years that the colonial policy succeeded to empower the corporate village, especially in central Java. Eighth, during the 19th century, both the Dutch colonial bureaucracy and the non-government western corporation needed a lot of workers; at first, the workers were paid, but after 1830 they were forced to work without payment under the obligatory planting system. After 1850, there were more paid workers became unpaid workers. Ninth, western companies operating in Java were not the enclaves separated from their surrounding, but they had a deep impact on the Javanese social and economical structures. Tenth, the agricultural activity developed by the Javanese people during 19th century experienced

many structural changes. Some of these changes were caused by the influence of the western companies operating in rural Java. The others were caused by the change in the composition of agricultural products¹.

Boomgard's explanation shows possibilities that the economic development in rural Java was in the same way with the advance of the colonial policy and also experienced progresses in non-agricultural field. After 1870, when there was a change in agrarian policy, by which it enabled Dutch businessman to have a long-term rent until 75 years (Agrarian law, April 9, 1870 S 50 and agrarian decree KB July 20, 1870 S 118)².

In rural Java, especially in Yogyakarta and Surakarta, there was a rapid development after transportation system was built by a Dutch company named *Nederlandsch Inlandsche Spoorweg (NIS)* to carry out sugar to Semarang's harbor in 1872. The establishment of the railroad in *Vorstenlanden* gave 2.6 million gulden profit and the good delivery increased until 270 percent in 5 years. Furthermore, after there was an additional railroad route in *Vorstenlanden* area such as Yogyakarta-Brosot, Yogyakarta-Magelang-Parakan, and also Surakarta-Boyolali, *Vorstenlanden* became a primary trade center³. In early 20th century, sugar became one of the most important industries in Yogyakarta, with the production of 230,000 ton per year, or 8% from all production in Java⁴. The supporting factor of the development of sugar industry in Yogyakarta was closely connected with the specific "*kesultanan*" ownership system. Sultan owned all of the lands, except "*tanah lungguh*", a piece of land given to the village head as the payment exchange. Farmers only had "*gaduh*" right (a proper right to use the land), not the property right (*eigendom*). This agrarian system in Yogyakarta was given a legal juridical principle through a decree, that was, *Rijkblad* of Yogyakarta no. 16, 1918. With this decree, a male farmer who fulfilled some requirements (*kuli kenceng*) was given two pieces of land called *glebag*, 2,500 meter square each⁵. One of those *glebag* had to be rented to the sugar plantation, while the other was used by the farmer to grow rice. Each *glebag* was exchanged once in a year and a half. With this kind of rule, there was a guarantee for the sugar plantation to have an access on a certain land every year. In 1920s, the breadth of *kesultanan's* land that was used for sugar cane in Yogyakarta reached 34,000 acres in odd and even years. It was 80% from all farmlands in Yogyakarta. The plantation owners had an agreement with Sultan without any discussion with the farmers. The rental fee was given to the Sultan, not to the farmers. In 1926, it cost F. 1,927,000, 28% from Sultan's governmental revenue⁶.

The colonial economic foundation that relied on the export of productive plants collapsed when there was a world's economic crisis in 1929-1930. The plantation workers were sent back home and it caused unemployment. In this critical period that the policy to develop industries outside the productive plants exploitation emerged. Many people tried to work on crafting again to support their economic subsistence. In some areas like in Yogyakarta, homemade silver industries in Kota Gede became the only economic sector that was mostly unaffected by the crisis, as it is explained by O'Malley⁷.

¹ The Kian Wie, forewords for Indonesian edition of *Anak Jajahan Belanda Sejarah Sosial dan Ekonomi Jawa 1795-1880*, published by KITLV and PT. Djambatan, Jakarta, 2004, xvi-xvii.

² Peter Boomgard, *Anak Jajahan Belanda Sejarah Sosial dan Ekonomi Jawa 1795-1880*, Jakarta: KITLV and PT. Djambatan, 2004, page 64.

³ Takhasi Siraishi, *Zaman Bergerak Radikalisme Rakyat di Jawa, 1912-1926*, Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1997, page 10-11 bdk *Koloniale Verslag, 1876, 1881, 1896*.

⁴ Aiko Kurasawa, *Mobilisasi dan Kontrol Studi Tentang Perubahan Sosial di Pedesaan Jawa 1942-1945*, Jakarta: Grasindo, 1993, page 43.

⁵ One *glebag* is more or less the same as the term sleman people use, *sakbagian*.

⁶ Aiko Kurasawa, page 44, Compared to Selo Sumardjan.

⁷ William Joseph O'Malley, *Indonesia in the Great Depression. A Study of East Sumatra and Yogyakarta in the 1930s*, Cornell Univ. NY, 1977, rewritten by Nirwono in *Prisma* 8, August 1983.

In weaving industry, then, colonial government had an initiative to develop the weaving home industry by improving the loom at ITB in 1937. In large scale, the government also ordered banks to give credit to all small-scale industries to attract the increase of home industries. In a short period, there was a significant growth in weaving industry. After there was a concern to develop the weaving home industries, the progress was amazing. It could be seen from the growth of the number of looms. It is recorded that in 1930 there were still 500 handlooms and 40 mechanical ones. In the next five years, it was already 4000 handlooms and 400 mechanical ones. In 1940, they reached a number of 35,000 handlooms and 6,600 mechanical ones. Home industry began to grow because the production activity in plantation decreased after the economic crisis in 1929. The mechanism of the subsistence activity recovered the economic crisis. People creatively created opportunities in the crafting field to survive. According to Mr. Adimulyo⁸ and his wife, they had learned to weave since colonial. They were workers of a weaving factory in Kota Baru, Yogyakarta. At the beginning of 1940, the economic condition in Netherlands East Indies was getting better, along with the growth of advertisement in newspaper that offered its products. One of the examples is the advertisement made by Kiem Bie, which offered clothes for European fashion style.

To attract the consumer, Kiem Bie gives an illustration of two European men. One of them is wearing a suit, a hat and holding a stick, while the other one is wearing a suit with a necktie. The text illustrating it is: Pakean officieel model taon 1939⁹ (The 1939 Official Fashion Model).

Under Japanese Government (1942-1945) and the Revolution (1946-1949)

During Japanese colonialism, people suffered. They were forced to work and to support Japan's need to fight against alliance forces. All economic activities were directed to support the war policies, for instance, the growing of castor oil plants, rice, cotton and the making of airport project for Japanese military. People were mobilized to fulfill Japan's needs. They hardly fulfilled their basic needs because of the strictness of the Japanese military policy. Aiko Kurasawa in the book, *Mobilisasi dan Kontrol*, finds interesting data in her research in rural Yogyakarta, due to the emergence of weaving home industry in Sumber Sari and Tumut, Moyudan district, under the sub-district of Godean, Yogyakarta.

In 1920-1940, Moyudan was an area of sugar plantation industry. A part of the rice field was rented for sugar cane plantation. In that area, there was a sugar cane factory, Padokan, which mastered Moyudan Area. Moyudan was a fertile land because it was irrigated from river Progo built in 1914. That irrigation was known as the irrigation of Van Der Week that is still used recently.

When Japanese arrived, farmers' lives were getting worse because of mass mobilization to built constructions for Japanese military. In Yogyakarta, there was a big construction project, for example, the establishment of irrigation canal connecting river Progo and Opak, which was known as Kanal Yoshiro¹⁰. Many people became volunteers (*Romusha*) who were sent out of Java for a long time. On the other hand, they were also forced to deposit their rice to the military government. Since the land was narrower and the

⁸ The owner of weaving home industry in Desa Gamplong Moyudan, Interviewed on June 12, 2004.

⁹ Taken from the flashback of PPPI cf. *Economic Weekblad*, February 8, 1939.

¹⁰ Kanal Yoshiro is now known as Selokan Mataram. Nonetheless, some people believe that the work to build the canal was the result of the negotiation between Sultan and Japan, so that many Jogja people were not sent as *Romushas*. They felt lucky better than those sent as *Romushas*.

government continuously forced them, many of them went out of their town to avoid the forced labor.

The result of Aiko Kurawa's research shows that condition made them find another job to survive. Some of them left their homes and other looked for a temporary income by making a certain product to be sold like a bamboo craft. When they experienced difficulties to fulfill their daily needs, many of them turned into merchants selling goods to get a profit. This phenomenon was largely found during that period, which Geertz called as peddlers or door-to-door sellers.

One of the new ideas the farmers found was the weaving industry. Since clothes were very rare, many people used jute and rubber to make a dress. Therefore, a weaving industry would make a profit if they could find good cotton. However, in Yogyakarta, the cotton plantation failed. And then, some rich farmers in Tumut, Sumber Sari, planned to smuggle cotton into Surakarta. Those who had a large capital secretly crossed the border and went to a market in Pedan, which was the center to collect cotton. They bought cotton in a large number and hired some women in that market to bring it little by little under their clothes. This illegal action always succeeded to pass the surveillance. And then, they employed their poor neighbors to weave the cotton. The sewed cotton was sold in Godean in better prices. Aiko did not get a clear data about the number of their employees and how much sewed cotton that could be produced. Whatsoever, the business rapidly grew.

Instead of farming, during Japanese colonialism, spinning and cotton weave are also empowered in villages. Spinning courses were held in every governmental level. For example in Indramayu regency, two *fujinkai* representatives from each district were sent to the regency's capital to be trained for about three months in 1944. This training was sponsored by *Hokokai* and *Fujinkai*'s regential branches headed by a regent's wife. The trainees were settled in a boarding house near regential office. They learned about the technique to separate the cotton from its seeds and spin it. After coming back from the training, it was their turn to hold similar trainings in district level and to train every representative from each village. The training equipments were made available by the government. *Hokokai* supported the training fee, including the meal and the boarding house. In Gunung Kidul regency, Yogyakarta, some permanent spinning courses were built everywhere like in Wonosari and Semanu. Through this training, the spinning technique was completely adopted by the society. Eventually, many families were busy with this business. With the cotton they produced, they started weaving by advancing the traditional loom. Before 1941 war, the manual loom for industry reached the number of 49,000 all over Java and approximately 34% were centered in Priangan. Because of Japan's encouragement, weaving as a home industry also grew in other parts in Java¹¹.

At that time, according to an informant from Indramayu, the cost of a piece of sarong, a Javanese traditional cloth, could be exchanged with four-quintal rice in the black market. It needed 4 days and 300 gram cotton to make a sarong. As clothes were very rare, thus, in some places, clothes became means of exchange¹². And as the weaving home industry grew, the scarcity could be overcome in a certain amount in 1944. The experience of spinning and weaving among people was made alive again under Soekarno's regime, in which the self-determination movement was emphasized with the usage of manual machine (ATBM).

When macro economic revolution was stuck, the subsistent economic as the survivor was still going on, such as traditional markets trading and the door-to-door one selling daily

¹¹ Aiko Kurasawa, *Mobilisasi dan Kontrol...*, page 32.

¹² Aiko Kurasawa, *Ibid.*

needs and any kinds of crafting. Economically, Indonesian government had not found an appropriate system. Almost all sectors were handled by foreigners. It was not until Dutch acknowledgement of Indonesia's sovereignty in December 1949 with the guarantee of the Dutch assets that the government began arranging policies to develop the autonomous economics, especially for the indigenous people. The most visible ones were the operation of *Benteng* economics, the establishment of industrialization commission and the dawn of the specific license for indigenous importers as the economic agents, due to the role-giving process and the development of indigenous businessman. The peak of this process was nationalization of foreign (Dutch) industries.

***Indonesianisasi* and Moyudan Weaving Industrialization (1950-1967)**

Indonesianisasi, in literary context, has various meanings. *Indonesianization* is Indonesian movement of economic nationalism, as it also appeared in the formerly colonized South East Asia countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In certain meaning, economic nationalism is rather considered emotionally than rationally. As it happened in Indonesia in the early time of independence, *indonesianisasi* meant the process of the expropriation of foreign assets and made them Indonesian. The freedom was not complete if there was no economic sovereignty. Among the young freedom fighters in the early independence, they wanted a hundred percent freedom, politically and economically. This group was represented by Tan Malaka and his followers such as Chaerul Saleh and Sukarni, who had a more radical view if compared with Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta's group, which was considered as colonialist collaborator (sic. Japan).

The movement of economic nationalism in Indonesia is known as *indonesianisasi*. The meaning of *indonesianisasi* is much more facilitated by the work of John O'Sutter, an ex-diplomat of the U.S. embassy in Jakarta who then studied at Cornell. In his thesis, Sutter defines *indonesianisasi* as "a conscious effort to increase the participation and elevate the role Indonesian and more particularly the 'indigenous' Indonesian in the more complex sectors of the economy"¹³. *Indonesianisasi* is a conscious effort to handle national economic sectors under the indigenous people. This indigenous people refers to the Indonesian ethnics such as Batak, Dayak, Bugis, Jawa, Sunda, Minangkabau, Madura and the descendants of European, Arabian, Indian and Chinese people who were born in Indonesia. There was, in fact, a negative sentiment that discriminated Chinese descendants from Indonesian people. Chinese ethnic was considered as a rival, rather than a part of the indigenous community, though they were born in Indonesia. Historically, the development of the movement of economic nationalism took place after the Second World War, especially the policy to control the external economic affairs and the economic sovereignty. The meaning was enlarged into a planned integration of different policies to pursue the economic development to modernization¹⁴. For the formerly colonized countries like Indonesia, it meant to conduct autonomous economic policy done by the indigenous people. *Indigenism* is a term that is used to describe policy's structure and organization built to change the racial dimension from colonial economic system inherited by Southeast Asia's people¹⁵. *Indigenization* is a term

¹³ John O'Sutter, *Indonesianisasi: Politics in a Changing Economy 1940-1955*, South East Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, 1959, page 2.

¹⁴ Modernization needs the changing condition of economics and society in developing countries after they are left by the colonialists. Under colonialism, the economics of the developing countries were encouraged by the development of "colonial laissez faire" policy that offered the acceleration of economic growth or the industrialization through the foreign investments.

¹⁵ Frank H. Golay et al, *Underdevelopment and Economic Nationalism in Southeast Asia*, Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca and London, 1968, page 9.

used by Anspach in his dissertation. In this context, it shows a control process toward the wealth and income resources distributed to national society members as the country's national economic identity. In a certain meaning, it has a connotative meaning like, for example, the process of *indonesianisasi* of economic activities in early independence to gain the control over the national economic resources.

The newest discussion about *Indonesianisasi* is done by Thomas Linblad in his paper, "The Importance of *Indonesianisasi* During the Transition from the 1930s to the 1960s"¹⁶. Linblad tries to settle the meaning of *Indonesianisasi* in Indonesian political context, especially after the Dutch acknowledgement of Indonesia's sovereignty in December 1949. He specifically discusses *Indonesianisasi* and its influence toward the existence of Dutch companies in Indonesia that were taken over (nationalization). According to Linblad, until now, there is a distortion connected with the nationalization process, so that a further research is needed from every point of view. For Linblad himself, *Indonesianisasi* done by Soekarno's administration was quite instant, along with many economic policies that were discriminative to the existence of foreign companies including the Dutch and Chinese companies. At first, the *Indonesianisasi* process of *De Javasche Bank* was peacefully done through the expropriation of the bank management and made it Indonesian, for Indonesian new government did need a central bank. The nationalization of *De Javasche Bank* was ruled by the constitution no. 24, December 6, 1951. Indonesian government gave compensation to the Dutch capital of about 120% from the nominal price in the Dutch currency, and to Indonesian people's capital of about 360% from the nominal price in Rupiah. The finance minister, Jusuf Wibisono, under the prime minister – Dr. Soekiman Wirjosandjojo's cabinet, did nationalization of *De Javasche Bank* with an open announcement sequence through the press and the hearing in the Temporary House of Representative (DPRS)¹⁷. At that time, economically, Indonesia was still dependent on foreign companies especially Dutch companies, which still dominated many prominent companies. The most unexpected thing for the Netherlands was the expropriation process of the Dutch companies and the expulsion of thousands of Dutch people from Indonesia to their homes, after the nationalization policy that was released in 1957.

Linblad, in his explanation about *Indonesianisasi*, concludes that the process took place gradually in the transitional era, from colonialism into Indonesian government as follows;

- 1) The root of the history can be found in the example of indigenous entrepreneurship since the end of colonialism until now that should be carefully watched.
- 2) *Benteng* policy employed in 1950-1957 is an *Indonesianisasi* forced by the government that caused the failure of the development of foreign capital investments (Dutch investment).
- 3) *Indonesianisasi*, along with the industrialization in the early Soekarno's government, gained its momentum though still in a limited area.
- 4) The most important thing in *Indonesianisasi* is the acknowledgement of ethnic identity that could unify in commerce and manufactures in the new businesses¹⁸.

The economic structure in the early Soekarno's government changed incredibly. There was a transformation in the method of exploitation of the colonial economic resources that improved commerce plant industries, such as sugar, coffee, and *nila*. The foreign capital was dominated by the U.S. and Japan that increased the investment on petroleum and gas exploration, manufacture production, and other non-agricultural

¹⁶ The paper was prepared for the conference on *Economic Growth and Institutional Change in Indonesia in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, Amsterdam, February 25-26, 2002.

¹⁷ *Fokus Kita* about Nationalization, May 2004.

¹⁸ Linblad, *The Importance of Indonesianisasi During the Transition from the 1930s to the 1960s*, Amsterdam, 2002, page 22.

industries. This fact can be seen from Masashi Nishihara's explanation¹⁹ that describes the relation between Japan and Soekarno in 1951-1966, due to the war subsidy and Japanese large investment in economic field. If it is seen from the trade balance and the number of investment in Indonesia, Japan was on the top level, followed by the United States of America and European Countries united in IGGI.

Soekarno's government applied a non-alliance political system that made him free from the dictation of the superpower countries, either the U.S. or the others. The macro political policy influenced governmental decision to build economic and political relations with other countries. Apart from the controversy about the nationalization of Dutch companies, the discussion about *Indonesianisasi* tries to see from the point of view of groups called "*pribumi asli*" (The indigenous people). Linblad says that the groups' effort was better, because it comes out from the gradual process in the momentum of *Indonesianisasi*. This case study on rural industry focuses on the district of Moyudan, especially Sumber Rahayu and Sumber Sari villages. Sumber Sari has its own history of weaving industry in Japanese colonization era, as Aiko Kurasawa said, while Sumber Rahayu emerges later as an area developing weaving industry when Soekarno's order applied self-determination principle. As a comparison, the rural areas in the borders such as Minggir and Kulon Progo are also identified. It is found that during the time, there was a kind of market and organization established to empower the weaving industry through cooperation, as an alternative especially in obtaining cotton material (Lawe) from the government. Kodiran's research about "Social and Economic Roles of cummerbund weaving women in Kulon Progo" shows market relations as a place to sell weaved products and to get the raw materials. At that time, the development of the rural weaving industry in Yogyakarta was very rapid because there was a policy to increase clothing by giving subsidy of raw materials to weavers. That organization was cooperation. In Yogyakarta, there were five primary cooperations. In Moyudan, there were Dwijaya cooperation in Sumber Rahayu, Sleman and Ekajaya cooperation in Godean/kajoran Sleman. One cooperation was in Kodya named Trijaya one primary cooperation in Kulon Progo named Caturjaya²⁰. These cooperation built to improve the weaving industry in Yogyakarta concerning the rapid growth in weaving industry. According to an informant in Kulon Progo²¹, the cooperation had a duty to distribute threads as the materials for weaving industries. The requirement needed to get this facility was that a weaver had to join a group and had at least 25 ATBM. Every loom got a pack of thread. The more the looms a weaver had, the more the subsidy he or she received. The thread subsidy had distracted the development of weaving industry in Rural Yogyakarta. Under Soekarno's regime, with his self-determination concept, people were not allowed to owe money from other countries. "*Ora oleh utang saka wong luar*" (Don't borrow money from foreigners). With those cooperation, the materials for weaving, threads, *wenter*, and others were available with a cheap price. The cooperation also functioned to collect the weaved-products from society. The thread materials were not only taken from factories in Secang or Cilacap, but also imported from Japan and China²².

The development of the weaving industry in Kulon Progo existed since the Dutch colonialism. In Nanggulan, there was a weaving factory, Amungkrida, belonging to a Dutch person. When Soekarno issued nationalization policy and the expulsion of Dutch

¹⁹ Masashi Nishihara, *The Japanese and Soekarno's Indonesia*, Monographs of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, an East West Center Book, the University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu.

²⁰ Kodiran, *Peranan Sosial dan Ekonomi Wanita Perajin Tenun Setagen di Kulon Progo D.I.Yogyakarta*, a research report, faculty of letters Gadjah Mada Univ., page 27.

²¹ Mrs. Sabar, the owner of a weaving company, Sabar Dadi, Nanggulan, Kulon Progo, interviewed on June 20, 2004.

²² Abdul Rozak, a weaving trainer in Ardja Sopir's weaving companies in Minggir, interviewed on may 30, 2004.

people and the burning of their factories, now, there is a Christian church established on it. The weaving home industry could involve many workers and decreased unemployment. Farmers worked seasonally. But if they worked in a factory, it would be far more profitable. The motivation to build a weaving industry was because it promised a good fortune and saved a lot of energy. The profit could be clearly estimated, better than if they were trading goods or farming. The continuation of the industry depended on the ability to follow the development and to see the situation. Like the improvement of a weaving industry, Sabar Dadi, in Krinjing, Nanggulan, which is still operating until now, was closely connected with the ability to follow any development. At first, when it was on top of its glory with its cummerbund product, Sabar Dadi had 200 looms. When the glory was over in 1970s, Sabar Dadi got an order from Betesda Hospital in Yogyakarta to make bandages. When Bali was crowded with many tourists, Sabar Dadi got an order again to fulfill the beachwear. Now, it is still steady although it has only 15 workers. Ordinarily, the weaving industry that still existed was the one owned by a person having a background as a merchant, because of his ability to see any opportunities and to quickly adjust the product to the consumers' interests. Most of these sectors were done by women. Actually, Javanese women played an important role in supporting the family's economics through trading and crafting²³

The most well-known weaving industry center in Sleman was in Moyudan district. As it is identified by Aiko Kurasawa, the development of weaving industry in Moyudan started since Japanese colonialism as a response for clothing scarcity and the suffering from the duties to deposit their rice and to work obligatorily for Japanese government. In this area, then, two primary cooperations were built to obtain materials. They were "Ekajaya" in Godean and "Dwijaya" in Sumberrahayu, Ngijon. According to an informant named Abdul Rozak, an ex-weaving trainer of a weaving industry in Minggir, Yogyakarta, whose position is the vice director of Ardjo Sopir's company, weaving industry rapidly developed in 1950-1960. It did not receive credit from the government but an ease to get weaving materials in cooperation. The thread was imported from China and Japan. It made sense that after the nationalization of the Dutch companies and their expulsion, Soekarno then created a wider relation with Japan, due to the war reparation payment (Rehabilitation payment). He also built a good relation with China (The Peking center) after the United States of America continuously backed rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi in the mid 1950s²⁴.

Weaving industry incredibly developed both in Indonesia and other developing countries because weaving industry was simple and easy to transfer to the society, as well as the fact that it is the basic need. Therefore, weaving industry becomes the priority of the industrialization process in a country. In Indonesia, weaving industry began in the 17th century. With the use of fiber, especially cotton, the weaver weaved their clothes²⁵.

Although there is a minimum record, but according to the informants, the development of weaving industry in Yogyakarta did begin since the Dutch colonialism. Before 1950s, the weaving corporation owners were mostly Dutch or Chinese. According to Mr. Ardja Uwuh²⁶, a weaving industry in Kota Baru, where some people from Moyudan learned to weave, belonged to a Chinese named Tan Tjoe Swan. Mr. Ardja also learned to weave in that place since 1939, after he graduated from *Volkschool Muhammadiyah*,

²³ Compare with Ann Stoler's research about *Struktur Kelas dan Otonomi Wanita di Pedesaan Jawa*, 1982, in Koencaraningrat (ed.), *Masalah-masalah Pembangunan*, Jakarta: LP3ES, PAGE 167-196.

²⁴ Lih. Audrey R. and George McT. Kahin, *Subversion as Foreign Policy. The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia*, New York, 1995 bdk Masashi Nishihara, *The Japanese and Soekarno's Indonesia. Tokyo-Jakarta Relation, 1951-1966*, Univ. Press of Hawaii Honolulu, 1976.

²⁵ Frans Seda, *Pertekstilan Nasional Indonesia, Perkembangan, Kondisi dan Prospeknya*, Prisma 5, 1985.

²⁶ Mr. Ardja Uwuh, born in Gamplong Moyudan, now lives in Minggir, interviewed on April 30, 2004.

Yogyakarta, in the same level as an elementary school. Weaving industry in Yogyakarta was increasing in 1951. After that, the Yogyakarta weaving corporation association named Trijaya was built in 1956. Weaving industry was very simple that the society would easily make the manual and modern looms by themselves, for example, Mr. Ardjo, together with his friends, could make a loom to spin bandages from *tosan* wreckage (Gear, dynamo, steel, etc).

If it is seen from the quantity, the number of the areas developing weaving industry in rural Yogyakarta, especially in Sleman, has a correlation with what Aiko says in her research that weaving industry in Japanese era were encouraged by the courses held in any village officials and the simple method of how to weave the cotton.

It is also found that the development of weaving industry in rural Yogyakarta was closely related with the development of the market and commerce. Those who own the weaving companies were mostly merchants. Some of the examples are Mrs. Sabar, who owns a weaving company, "Sabar Dadi", Mrs. Adimulyo who owns a weaving industry, "Ardi Craft", and also the owner of the weaving industry, "Puspa Sari" in Sangubiru, Moyudan, were door-to-door sellers. The marketing of the weaving home industry's products was in traditional markets such as Beringharjo in Yogyakarta, Ngijon in Moyudan, Sleman, Godean, Kentheng in Kulonprogo, and Klewer in Solo. The marketing outside the town could reach Magelang and Pekalongan, even it also reached Sumatra, especially Lampung.

The decrease of weaving home industry cannot be separated from the changing pattern of dressing among Indonesian people because of western influences. The collapse of the cummerbund weaving industry was because of the rivalry from foreign products. Indonesian women, especially Javanese women, since 1970, seemed to likely use trousers or skirt, while Javanese traditional clothes was only used in a special event like traditional party (if there was a celebration). Since 1970, when there were foreign capital investments in textile industry, the westernization process in Indonesian style happened, especially among the young generations.

Closing

Indonesianisasi policy that is moved by the national macro political structure to develop the indigenous people's roles in technology and capital transfer to improve indigenous entrepreneurship between 1950-1960s under Soekarno era in the case of weaving industry in rural Yogyakarta, there are some crucial data that are found. The improvement of the simple industry supported by self-determination principle makes people increase non-agricultural economic sectors as their lives' support. A significant development happened when there was a support to optimize the textile industry before the coming of foreign products into Indonesia. There were also people's economic organizations and the local net marketing for the weaving home industry developed in Yogyakarta. In this case, the *indonesianisasi* process happened more naturally, in the accordance with people's ability in understanding the market situational improvement and the inclination of the change of modern society.

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